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CHAPTER THREE 
Samuel Beckett, The Sublime, 
The Worst 
Samuel Beckett's texts are populated with characters who have been so 
deprived of their humanity that humanity appears as essentially absent from 
his texts. The characters' presence in the diegesis is marked by unmistakable 
/ii 
absences-absence of vision, of mobility, of sense, of name. Beckett's characters \ 
are often without; without hair, wi thout teeth, without forseeab le future. The j 
human character is at the limit of humanity and runs the risk of passing over 
into the grey zone of the inhuman. They lose track of their place, of their time, 
of their names. They frequently belong to no time and no place. When they 
are specifica lly situated, they are in and among ru ins. "Ruins true refuge long 
last towards which so many fa lse time out of mind," begins his own translation 
of "Sans" (without) as "Lessness." 1 Beckett's writing begins in ruins as a refuge 
with neither ingress nor egress, "true refuge, issueless." 2 Ruins are "scattered," 
d iffused across the imaginary plane that the text creates. The text seems not to 
refer to anything worldly or mundane, but is instead an imaginary creation, 
proceeding from the refuge of the ruins in which ruined figures dwell. 
Beckett's texts are figurations of the ruined subject in which text and 
character become coextensive with the ruins that are the object of the writing, 
"Little body same grey as the earth sky ruins only upright." 3 The human body 
is a body in ruins, differentiated from its surroundings only by its posture. 
This sense of the ruined body is coextensive in Beckett's works with the ruins 
of the mind, the ruined ideas of modernity, and will be the main theme for 
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our co nsideration of the sublime in his works. His texts bear witness to an 
intens ified assault on the category of the human, all the while they recognize 
that the human was never fully what Enlightenment philosophy claimed it to 
be. Enlightenment philosophy taught that Man could liberate himself, indi-
vidually and collectively, from the chains of his misery and servitude by the 
right exercise of reason. Reason was to excise all traces of superstition and fa l-
sity that kept "us" from liberating ourselves. En lightenment was not just a phi-
losophica l, cu ltural, and religious mo ment of modernity, but a co mprehensive 
intellectual, cultural, and politica l mob ili zation of Reason in the service of 
liberation. The fruits of that mobili zation are, at best, a mixed bag. Neverthe-
less, at the center of this mobilization was a phi losophy of Man that made him 
the artificer of his own future and the ufficient condition for his own libera-
tion. The idea of Man, then, is at the origin of Enlightenment as the final 
cause. It is the end and the aim of Enlightenment, and also its organizing 
principle. Enlightenment insistence on reason and its conception of Man lie 
at the or igin of Beckett's wr iting as impetus and hurdle. lt is this idea of Man 
that Beckett's sublime seeks to reconfigure; it is an effort to remember what 
Enlightenment ideo logy had already, in its organizing moments, forgotten. 
= Beckett's writing participates in an anamnesis of the human and inhu-
man. Let us recall that Lyotard conceives of the inhuman as secret source of 
what co nstitutes the human. Beckett's concern with the inhuman comprises 
part of an effort to carry out the anamnesis of the assau lt o n humanity that 
never abated in the twentieth century and even continues on and on. To illus-
trate the processive nature of Beckett' s anamnesis of the inhuman, we will be-
gin with an explication of the 1946 radio essay, "The Capital of the Ruins."4 
T his text, which is rarely accorded much weight with Beckett scholars, none-
theless makes a clear statement as to his concerns as a wr iter, and it illustrates 
a thoroughly political d imension to his writing that is too ofte n obscured. 
Then, we wi ll discuss the difficulties in writing about Beckett, the r isks that 
writing abou t Beckett open to criticism, and the ways in wh ich the reflective 
judgments of the aesthetic of the sublime can obviate these difficulties. Such 
judgments exclude determinate claims that would make their objects into dis-
crete cognizab le units. Determinate judgments proceed accord ing to a pre-
given set of categories that are either generated by the mind itself o r by refer-
ence to historical events, facts, or figurations. "Beckettlessness" is the name of 
the infectio n in criticism that urges the cr itic to accomplish for Beckett what 
Beckett could not- to arrive at the silence of a still point. By necess ity, judg-
ments of the sublime never perm it thought this fina l arrival at the destination. 
W e wi ll argue that the most adequate "understanding" of Beckett's wr iting is 
one that releases itself from the project of understanding by determinative 
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judgments. That is, the aesthetic reflective judgment is the mode in which 
Beckett's work ought to become the object of our attention. Third, we will 
present The Unnameable as a prelude to Worstward Ho. Here, we will emphasize 
the way in which Beckett begins to question the process of narrative and its 
destinies. By the 1950's Beckett had opened and entered the zone of writing 
that crysta lli zes in his last books in which narrative becomes a response to an 
obl igation. This is present already in The Unnameable, but is the sine qua non of 
narrative in the final books, Company, Ill Seen Ill Said, and especia lly Worstward 
Ho. Finally, we wi ll argue that the worst as it is art icu lated as a principle of 
narration in Worstward Ho is a process of lessen ing language that seeks to pre-
sent what is unpresentable in language- "the unnullable least." It is in this 
text that we come into contact with Beckett's Thing, that never present, never 
absent, immaterial material of the sublime sentiment. The worst is a way of 
figuring the sublime that attests to the terror that co mes with the idea of a 
humanity in ruins. The worst is a response to a cultural failure that itself 
adopts the logic of fa ilure in order (perhaps) to succeed. 
The Human in Ruins 
In 1946 Beckett de livered the rad io address, "The Capital of the Ruins," from 
the Irish Hospital at St. Lo in Normandy. The text is not often taken as an 
important work by Beckett scholars partly because it has bee n, as S.E. 
Gontarski notes "shrouded in mystery, confu sion , and error since its , . 
discovery amid the archives of Radio Telefis Eireann in 1983 and its 
publication in 1986."5 The text, furthermore, had seen some editor ial 
reworking of a stylistic and not substa ntive nature, though S.E. Gontarski's 
editing was able to restore Beckett's origi nal language. 
Gontarski's editorial notes to the Grove Press edition of Beckett's Com-
plete Short Prose adds to the obscurity of "The Capital of the Ruins" in two 
ways. First, rather than incorporate the text into the body of the book, in 
which the texts are arranged chronologically by date of original publication, he 
places it as an appendix. This may seem to be an unders tandable choice, for it 
seems odd that this nonfiction address would be placed among "First Love," 
"The Expelled," "The Calmative," or "The End." But, the discontinuity it 
would add to the text would serve to give a more complicated and nuanced 
impression of Beckett and his writing rather than detract from it. Second, 
Gontarski limits the heft of the text by calling it, "a short piece of reportage."6 
Gontarski also reports that Beckett had no memory of having made the text, 
/ 
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thus insinuating, if not outright claiming, that the text is incidental. As we will 
show below, if considered carefu lly, it is not just reportage, but an assessment 
of the site of the struggle for modern consciousness and especia lly, of modern 
self-consciousness, and is programmatic of Beckett's work in the years after the 
war. 
In Damned to Fame: The Life of Samue l Beckett, James Knowlson corrects the 
view offered by Gontarski, although he does not offer a detailed reading of 
"The Capital of the Ruins." Beckett had been engaged in Resistance activities 
during the War and had worked very hard to set up a hospital in St. Lo. For 
Knowlson, this experience proved decisive for Beckett's later artistic concerns: 
"this period at St. Lo was probably vital in terms of the content of his postwar 
writing." 1 In St. Lo, Beckett witnessed misery and devastation that affected 
him deeply and brought him into contact with groups of people with whom 
he had little contact before the war. 6 "The Capital of the Ruins" attests to this. 
Stylistically, "The Capi tal of the Ruins" is perhaps Beckett's least ellipt ical, 
least playful, least Beckettian text. Yet, it treats a serious problem that is not 
incidental to his artistic concerns, as Knowlson suggests, but does not specify. 
Even though Beckett claims to have forgotten "The Capital of the Ruins," the 
text is part of the basis of his artistic experimentation. It is one appearance of 
Beckett's Thing, always forgotten, but unforgettab le, as Lyotard phrases it. The 
experience of the Capital of the ruins in France is one source of anamnesis 
that Beckett's later texts address. 
"The Capital of the Ruins," begins with a description of the Hospital at 
St. Lo that had been operated by the Irish Red Cross. By the end of the war, 
the grounds of St. Lo were a muddy, ruined mess, like much of the rest of 
Europe. The buildings were prefabricated huts that were in general, better 
than what was ava ilable to everyone else: 
There is real glass in the windows. The consequent atmosphere is that of brightness 
and airiness so comforting to sick people, and to weary staffs. The floors, where the 
exigencies of hygiene are greatest, are covered with linoleum. There was not enough 
linoleum in France to do more than this. The walls and ceiling of the operating 
theatre are sheeted in aluminium of aeronautic origin, a decorative and practical 
solution of an old problem and a pleasa nt variation on the sword and ploughsha re 
metamorphosis.9 
Beckett's description of the site and layout of the hospital emphasizes the 
practical connecti ons of material to function; he is concerned with giving a 
description of the hospital that is both accurate, and moving. It is a 
description of suffer ing and the attempt to alleviate it. But, Beckett is not 
satisfied with this description, it becomes the beginning of a political and 
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aesthetic intervention that will stay with him (even when he has forgotten it) 
through his last writings. 
"These few facts, chosen not quite at random, are no doubt famili ar al-
ready to those at all interested in the subject, and perhaps even to those listen-
ing to the present circumlocution. They may not appear the most immediately 
instructive," 10 Beckett states as he begins his address. This beginning says what 
it should not have to say were it true. That is, his intervention is obvious and 
so it is not necessary to be published. What he is saying is well known, and 
hence not in need of repetition. His characterization of the address as a "cir-
cumlocution" is important because Beckett will consistently adopt circumlocu-
tion, a talking around his topic, as a rhetorical strategy to get at a key 
experience that would otherwise retreat from his approach. His intervention 
must therefore be heard, even by those in the know, because the manner in 
which he approaches the reality of the Irish Hospital will reveal what has yet to 
be seen about it. Circumlocution will show what other forms of address will 
not be able to show. 
Circumlocution, however, anchors itself to the real through certain de-
terminative sentences: "St. Lo was bombed out of existence in one night." 11 
The audacity of this sentence, its clear and simple structure, troubles Beckett's 
text. It is simple and even banal and yet not reducible to mere hyperbole. This 
is the source of its terror. Not only was St. Lo so bombed from existence, but 
many other places as well, both within and beyond the borders of France, in 
Europe and elsewhere around the globe. The sentence menaces thought be-
cause of its simplicity, its lack of nuance, of detail, of flourishes. It is the nega-
tion and inverse of the Fiat lux of the classical tradition, yet no less sublime, in 
its capacity to draw thought to its own limit. If St. Lo was so bombed from 
existence, how then, can the experience of St. Lo be phrased? This question is 
a repetition and displacement of the question that opens Lyotard's The Differ-
end. In that text, Lyotard asks how it will be possible for survivors of a death 
camp to speak of their experiences. If they are survivors of a death camp, then 
they were not in a death camp and their testimony is false. Or, they were in a 
death camp, but since they can only know a portion of it, they cannot testify 
to the existence of the camp itself and their testimony is fa lse. Lyotard does 
not defend this argument, which bears the form of arguments made by Holo-
caust deniers. Rather, it opens the question of the possibility of testimony in 
an impossible situation . 
The creation of the hospital in the throes of devastation, in the ruins of 
St. Lo is the sign of continuity in the universe, of an impossible continuity: 
"'Provisional' is not the term it was, in this universe become provisional." 12 
Here we can begin to sense the recasting of the sublime as sentiment and fig-
.... 
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uration that bears within it a belief in the future in spite of itself; that is, Beck-
ett does not despair in spite of the terror and destruction that appear to be 
necessary and inevitable. 
In the provisional universe, that is, a universe with a borrowed, limited, 
and uncertain existence, human beings get on with living, with dying, with 
negotiating between the two. The workers in St. Lo learned this, most of all, 
and that opens to them a special kind of possibility: 
l mean the possibility that some of those who were in Sa int-Lo will come home 
realising that they got at least as good as they gave, that they got indeed what they 
could hardly give, a vision and a sense of a time-honoured conception of humanity in 
ruins, and perhaps even an inkling of the terms in which o ur condition is to be 
thought aga in. These will have been in France. 13 
In these closing lines of what most writers find to be a marginal and incidental 
intervention of uncertain status, Beckett nevertheless lays bare the political, 
philosophical, and aesthetic stakes of what will have been his own history. The 
war does not only scar the human psyche, it is not just a mass form of 
traumatization, but assau lts the very idea of the human and the human's 
humanity. This assau lt cuts deep and does not leave politics and art 
untouched. In these closing lines Beckett attacks the very core of 
Enlightenment humanism which art and thought can no longer sustain. The 
tasks of art and thought will be to rethink our condition in the new terms that 
the exper ience of St. Lo has bequeathed to us. 
In the fall of this humanism, "our condition" has to be reconceived. The 
ruins of St. Lo are not just in St. Lo; they will be the material with which 
thought must grapple if it is to re-think its condition without fa lling into the 
amnesia of repetition or the conscious repetition of remembrance. "The Capi-
tal of the Ruins" is the beginning of a rewriting in Beckett's art that traverses 
all of his post war writing. "The Capital of the Ruins" becomes the object-
cause of an anamnesis, a project of rewriting that spans all of the post-war 
years. 
While many of Beckett's critics think that they can finish this rewriting, 
Beckett most decidedly cou ld not. Nevertheless, the interminable work of re-
writing has a two-fold heritage: it belongs to Beckett in as much as he signs the 
works, and it belongs to the critics who sign on to this project. The desire to 
finish with anamnesis, which is an interminable work though not without its 
own sense of finality, becomes a sickness in Beckett criticism that infects even 
the best writing on Beckett. For critical writing, not unlike the novel, the play, 
the film, has its own sense of style, of project, of aim and end. However ill de-
fined, however held in suspension, those concerns gu ide its writing without 
predetermining it. Experimental writing, of the kinds produced by Beckett 
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and others of the avant-garde, require an equally exper imental criticism. We 
share Beckett's trajectory, but after Beckett, we plod our own way, shoulders 
hunching under the inheritance we cannot forsake or forget. 
Beckettlessness 
Many of Beckett's critics hope to accomplish what none of Beckett's works 
could- they hope to finish. Beckett expressed an overwhelming desire to be 
done with language, identity, being and to arrive at a "still point" that would 
erase a ll those stains on silence and nothingness that writing produces. This 
nearly maniacal drive which belongs to Beckett and his narrators is 
reproduced in the criticism of his work with a decisive difference. Beckett 
never finishes. He never arrives at the end. The texts barely begin and often 
they end in abandonment more than resolution or conclusion. In Beckett's 
writing, every step is a misstep, each stroke of the pen is subject to immediate 
erasure by the sentence which fo llows it. The linking of the phrases of his 
narrations appears to be without rule, certai nly without the finality implied in 
narrative emplotment as Paul Ricoeur describes it in Time and Narrative. For I 
Ricoeur, who follows Aristotle, emplotment is decisive in the creation of a ~ 
meaningful narrative. The placement of events in time makes meaning and 
without this placement, narrative devolves into nonsense. But, plot in 
Beckett's writing is not the source of his texts' agon istics. The significant 
drama of his texts originates in the struggle of language to come into being, to 
utter the truth of fai lure. Beckett's words fail to accomplish their aims. The 
aim, ironica,lly, is to fail. The fai ling words fail to fail; this is the drama of his 
writing. 
Beckett's critics work continually to discover in his writing the conceptual 
and critical devices that will disclose the truth of the texts's articu lations, the 
truth of failure. This drive certain ly betrays the work of Beckett's books- such 
critical apparatuses are doomed to betray, cannot but betray, the silence he 
sought to occupy and which the texts long to inhab it. But, this betrayal is the 
least problematic of betrayals since it is unavoidable lest the critical imagina-
tion be reduced to a si lent witness of Beckett's writing. Such an avowal would 
make of us those witnesses who never testify, who never intervene, and hence 
are relegated to oblivion. 
The unforgivable betrayal is the critic's determination of the concept or 
concepts that he or she insists wi ll explain Beckett's writing and which need 
only be deployed by the critic. The concept as critical tool is prone to betrayal 
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because of its aspi rations to being definitive, co mprehe nsive. It is neither nec-
essary nor possible to perfo rm a total asces is of concepts fro m our minds and 
thought since understanding obliges us to them. W e have to make use of 
them, but they are not as pos itively explanatory as we li ke to believe. The con-
cept is explanato ry in a limited, restrictive way and subject to continual revi-
sion even when it is applied to the sa me obj ect. Beckettlessness enters cri t icism 
when the concept beco mes the fixed source of understanding and knowledge. 
Such concepts show a basic contempt fo r the plurality that co nstitutes the art-
work. Plurality is itse lf a concept, but a concept that merely delimits the ra nge 
and number of possible significations of the artwork. The engagement of the 
concept ought to fo llow this model; we should make use of the concepts that 
the heritage leaves us, all the while denying their claims to authority. Author-
ity, if such a term still has a meaning, will have to be generated anew through 
the deconstruction of authori zing terms. Such is the positio n that writing 
about Beckett creates for us. 
Beckettlessness is the result of a critical drive to explain, to understand; it 
is the condition that infects Beckett criticism and manifests itse lf as the critic's 
des ire to have had the last word o n Beckett. H e or she hopes that finally the 
silence will be had, that fin ally respite is at hand, that narrative ca n be fin-
ished, identity finished, history fini shed. Thinking about Beckett tempts critics 
to speak the words that Beckett's books never could, that the plays never 
could, that the television and film never could, to translate what was never 
sa id, written, or seen into another register where the figurations could then be 
given a full conceptual accounting. Beckettlessness shows our desire to be sure 
that Beckett' s failures were not entire ly failures . 
The search for the determining concept of Beckett's texts as the resolution 
to their indeterminacy is not a good so lution to the di fficulty of reading Beck-
ett. The modernist dream that the artwork ultimately is a unity whose co m-
plexiti es can be clarified, exposed, and whose co ntradi ctions can be 
harmonized within its co mplexity dupe Beckett' s reader if he or she remains 
tempted by it for too long. It is an idea, like so many of Beckett's, that is best 
left aside, jettisoned with the rest of the ruins and detritus of the culture. 
Leo Bersani and Ulysse Duto it remark o n the odd situation that Beckett's 
critics feel as comfortable as they do when talking about Beckett: 
There is something not only admirable but eminently acceptable, and even 
respectable, in this career, which may explain why we are struck by the ease with 
which he is talked about, by how little he seems to have tro ubled the admirers of his 
demo nstratio ns of cos mic mea ninglessness and the demise o f weste rn philosophy- in 
sho rt, how comfo rtable Beckett makes his cri tics fee l. 14 
Beckettlessness. 
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After listing a selection of "heady claims" they let the irony stand but back 
away from claiming any truth or falsity: "we quote these heady claims not to 
suggest that they are wrong, which is not the point." 15 They indicate only cer-
tain symptoms that Beckett's critics exhibit in relation to his writing, symp-
toms which, accord ing to them, might best be described as an undeserved 
sense of comfort that one ga ins from having read, or engaging in the reading 
of Beckett. 
What is the origin of that comfort? What is the latent thought that the 
manifest content of the claim is hiding? What thoughts are the source of the 
symptom? Beckettlessness is not an answer to these questions; it is on ly a name 
for the affliction of wanting to be done with Beckett, to finish where Beckett 
did not. 
Two contemporary writers whose work suffers from Beckettlessness, but 
who offer, nonetheless provocative readings of Beckett's work are Leslie Hill in 
Beckett's Fiction: In Different Words and Thomas Tresize in Into the Breach: Sam-
uel Beckett and the Ends of Literature. The modes of their symptoms are not en-
tirely the same, though. Tresize displaces Beckett from one intellectual history 
into another. On his view, Beckett has been wrongly understood as an existen-
tialist writer. His books, on this view, treat existentialist themes of absurdity, 
freedom, guilt, obligation. Tresize's claim is that Beckett is not an existential-
ist, but a post-structuralist. His experimentations in the novel are not about 
the existential, but prefigure and follow upon the philosophical and lingu istic 
insights of Jacques Derrida. So, Into the Breach portrays a Beckett who is a Der-
ridean and novelist of differance. The change in perspective that the theoretica l 
shift that Tresize defends may offer a new way of reading Beckett, but it also 
displaces and then repeats the trappings of the earlier read ing. In this manner, 
Beckett becomes the object of fashion and each generation will uncover the 
real Beckett as the critica l rage of the day demands. This is a betrayal of Beck-
ett's aim to fail and to seek fai lure radica lly. It is a view of Beckett that lets us 
off the hook with Beckett by putting h im in the company of others who can 
better explain his fai lures. Leslie Hill, unlike Trezise, undertakes a detailed 
ana lysis of Beckett's major prose works and, in many ways, produces an admi-
rable book. Yet, for all that, his book is prone to the forgetfulness of Beckett 
that characterizes cr iticism infected with Beckettlessness. 
The risk of criticism is Beckettlessness; it intrudes on cr iticism at those 
moments when criticism claims and aims to understand and to communicate 
its understanding through a conceptual armature. This risk is not our inven-
tion, but is intimated by Beckett himself in the "Three Oialogues." 16 This text 
is cast as a dialogue between Beckett and Georges Duthuit, though it is gener-
ally regarded as the invention of Beckett himself. Widely cited as one of Beck-
/ 
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ett's clearest interventions into the nature of the artist's work, it also illustrates 
and engages what we mean by Beckettlessness: 
B.- Would it not be enough if I simply went away? D.- No. You have begun. Finish. 
Begin aga in and go on until you have finished. Then go away. Try and bear in mind 
that the subject under discussion is not yourself, not the sufist Al-Haqq, but a 
particular Dutchman by name van Velde, hiterto erroneously referred to as an artiste 
peintre. 17 
Beckett's interlocutor, Duthuit, insists that he go on, that he must "fi ni sh," 
even as Beckett himself just wants to go away without saying anything further. 
His interlocutors force him at least to gesture toward completion, and when 
that does not happen, they co mplete his task for him. This is an infidelit)', 
according to Beckett, to the artist's drive toward fai lure: 
My case, since I am in the dock, is that van Velde is the first to des ist from this 
es theticized auto matism, the first to adm it that to be an artist is to fail, as no other 
dare fail, that fa ilure is his world and the shrink from it dese rtion, art and craft, good 
housekeeping, li ving. No, no, allow me to expire. 18 
Beckett's des ire, expressed through his interpretation of Abraham van Velde, 
is to be left alone. Not to die, but to be permitted by his interlocutor to drift 
from our consciousness. To permit him to be what he is, as he is. Beckett 
continues, 
I know that all that is required now to bring this horrible matter to an acceptable 
conclusio n, is to make of this submiss ion, this admission, this fideli ty to fai lure, a new 
occas ion, a new term of relation, and of the act which, unable to act, obliged to act, 
he makes, an expressive act, even if only of itself, of its impossib ili ty, of its 
obligation . 19 
Beckett's interlocutors push him, aga inst his will and even without his 
knowing it, toward the betrayal of fa ilure. Every time the critic accomplishes 
what Beckett could not, to finish or to begin, to act, the critic suffers fro111 
Beckettlessness. Fleeing from the risk of fa ilure, criticism betrays its object and 
Beckett criticism loses its object and aim. And in this vein, thinking after 
Beckett takes on a decis ively chro nologica l meaning: to think afte r Beckett 
means to think after the passing of Beckett. Whereas what we need is a 
thinking after Beckett in whi ch Beckett is both before and behind us. Even if 
we would like to be done with Beckett, we are never done with Beckett. We 
never fini sh with him; he expires. This perspective preserves his relation to 
fa ilure, and by proxy, our own. 
In Le Monde et le pantalon, Beckett raises the q uestion of the role, function, 
and work of criticism in relation to painting, and aga in in relation to the 
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painting of the van Velde brothers, Abraham and Gerard us. Beckett wrote this 
text in 1945 for the exposition of their canvases at the Mai (Abraham) and 
Maeght (Gerardus) galleries and it was first published in Cahiers de !'art 
20/21. The text was later published with another writing on the van Velde 
brothers, "Les peintres de l'empechement," by Minuit. In the first article, 
Beckett scoffs at the possibilities for criticism, especially any criticism that pre-
tends to attain to any degree of refinement, he does not even want to speak of 
such things: "Let's not talk of what is properly ca lled criticism. The best ones, 
the likes of a Fromentin, of a Grohmann, a McGreevy, Sa uerlandt is all like 
Am iel. All hysterectomies by trowel. And how might it be otherwise?"20 
How might it be otherwise? How might criticism become something less 
violent, less violate than a hysterectomy at trowel poin t? The hysterectomy is 
not just an emphatic and provocative metaphor, but goes to the core of what 
art does as the work of human creativity and freedom. 21 Just as the hyster is the 
source of human creativity and the hysterectomy by trowel is an assau lt on that 
crea tivi ty, so is criticism an assault on art. An assault that is not just a denun-
ciation or a misunderstanding, but is an attack on its essential functions and 
features. But still, criticism wi ll be written, but how? How ca n criticism not 
violate its object? How can it proceed? 
Criticism and art have a difficult relationship. The arti st is aided or hin-
dered by his or her critics, the criticism will work or not for the arti st, it ca n be 
more or less adequate to its objects. Beckett lists so me possibi lities: 
Either yo u do a genera lized aesthetics like Lessing; a charming ga me. 
Or, you report on anecdotes, like Vasar i or Harper's Magazine. 
O r, you make Catalogues Raisonnes, like Smith . 
O r, you can just open yourself to a confused and disagreeable rambling. That is the 
case here. 22 
Beckett's practice of criticism, at least as he exhibits it here, ca nnot be ca lled 
criticism, properly speaking; it is a rambling, confused and unpleasa nt, 
profusion of words. Not an aesthetic theory, not anecdotes and gossip, not a 
systematic li sting of works, but a bold surrendering to the profusion of words. 
It is thus difficult to say what constitutes "good" critici sm from "bad," as the 
speaking about the work is less an autonomous activity than an obligation to 
which o ne must surrender. W e have to remember that art, for Beckett, takes 
place under the sign of an obligation. In the "Three Dialogues," Beckett 
claims, 
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B.- the situation is that of him who is helpless, cannot act, in the event cannot paint, 
since his is obliged to paint. The act is of him who, helpless, unable to act, acts, in the 
event paints since be is obliged to paint. 
0 .- Why is he obliged to paint? 
B.- 1 don't know. 23 
Just as art is an obligation, so criticism becomes a form of responsibility. The 
affliction of Beckettlessness arises from a failure to surrender boldly to the 
demands of an obligation one does not quite enjoy or understand- to feign 
that understanding is to succumb fully to the infection. 
Infected or not, let us now turn toward the manner in which Beckett's art 
responds to the demands of revising the conception of the human as detai led 
in "The Capital of the Ruins." From the perspective that the risk of Becket-
tlessness opens, Beckett himself becomes an event, forgotten and unforgetta-
ble, present only through negative presentation, thought only in the wake of 
the disaster of our inab ility to circumscribe Beckett. To write about Beckett 
opens a reference to the sublime, even when that reference appears most re-
mote. 
Obligation 
Worstward Ho is Beckett's rewriting of narrative, of his own art and of art in 
genera l; it seeks to attest to the deflation of the idea of Man that is among his 
chief obsessions and which dates at least to "The Capital of the Ruins." The 
Unnameable occupies a place in Beckett's writing that is analogous to 
Worstward Ho. Both texts are third in a series, and each text works and reworks 
problematics from the texts that preceded them. "The Trilogy," as it is often, if 
erroneously called, of Molloy, Malone Dies, and The Unnameable are Beckett's 
first major attempts to work through the deflation of the human being to 
inhuman form, though they are certainly not his last. And the third novel's 
opening question, "Where now? Who now? When now? Unquestioning,"H 
prefigures the question of the later "trilogy" of Company, Il1 seen, I11 Said, and 
Worstward Ho which were published co llective ly by Grove Press under the title 
Nohow On. The Unnameable and Worstward Ho are companion texts, texts that 
can be seen to accompany one another, though with considerable differences. 
These differences are large ly rhetorical and bear on Beckett's late insistence on 
subtracting from language and from the traditional characteristics of the novel 
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in order to arrive at that silence and stillness he had sought throughout his 
li fe. 
The narrator of The Unnameable, the unnameable, situates himself in a 
landsca pe that is as barren as it is frightening. What is striking is how com-
fo rtable he is in that emptiness, so co mfortable that he seems little frightened 
by the emptiness he occupies. Fright is absent from his descriptions as if he 
were simply fo llowing a procedure that will allow him to make a narrative, 
"how proceed," he asks: 
For I am obliged to ass ign a beginning to my res idence here, if only fo r the sake of 
clari ty. Hell itself, although eternal, dates fro m the revo lt of Luci fe r. It is therefore 
permiss ible, in . the light of this d istant analogy, to think of myself as being here 
forever, but not as having been here fo rever. T his will grea tly help me in my 
relation. 25 
The unnameable is obliged to speak and this obligation to speak lies at the 
origin of the novel as its impetus and ru le. The phrases of his narratio n come 
to pass as responses to this obligation. He seeks to explain his obligation, to 
give it a bas is in reaso n, fo r without the explanation his situat ion and relation 
lose the se mblance of sense. For the sake of clarity there must be a beginning 
to his situation, he claims. 
The unnameable's identity is produced in and through the references to 
prior sto ries. The story of his identity will be buried in other stories. Identity, I 
like the va lue of the sign in Saussurea n linguistics, is presented as a differentia-
tion without positive determ ination. The unnameable exists as a nameable 
entity only through the fact that signs are differentiated from other signs. 
Identity thereby proceeds also from a negation; it produces its positive content 
by negating the determin ate "name." The unnameable annihilates identity as a 
stable, underlying substratum that rece ives determinations. To put it another 
way, the concept of identity fu nctions in Beckett 's text as an effect of narrative 
and not as its so urce. 
The unnameable is as Lucifer was; one who has revolted (from what 
though, has he revo lted?) and thereby has been put in his current situation by 
vi rtue of an alien agency. In the old story, God casts Lucifer to hell and this 
single act solidifies his presence on the cosmic scene fo r all eternity. The un-
nameable res ides as he is where he is because he is the distant relation to that 
original criminal. The analogy complicates itself. W e must remember that Lu-
ci fe r's fault is that of pride, the audacity of thinking himself the equal of God. 
The form of his fault is a misrecognition of his own stature. Lucifer falls from 
heaven because of an erro r in judgment that he refuses to relinquish. The un-
nameable, though, runs the risk of his distant relation only in as much as he is 
obligated to speak. The obligation to speak does not dictate at the same time 
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the content of the speech. Thus, the faulty analogy is as good as or as ill as an-
other one. The analogy looks ahead to Beckett's late notion, presented most 
clearly in Ill Seen, Ill Said, that any saying or seeing is necessarily faulty- the 
good and bad views are equally faulty. Failure, then, lurks everywhere. Beckett 
clearly adopts a view of narration and experience that makes statements both 
equally true and equally false. Reporting on the senses is fraught with diffi-
culty, but they function nonetheless. Even when they do not function they are 
functional. This is not an endorsement of a banal re lativism, but a forcefu l 
critique of the power of conventional meaning making systems. In this view, 
necessity flees fro.m the drama of his narrative and only contingency and rela-
tion remain. 
The unnameable is not alone in his narrating, but has some company. 
Namely, the company of those characters who populated Beckett's earlier writ-
ings: Malone, Molloy, Mercier and Camier, among others. In this, the un-
nameable as narrator takes on the position of the implied author, to refer to 
Wayne Booth's concept from The Rhetoric of Fiction. The company, though, is a 
company of words (and of works: books) and thus ephemeral and fleeting via 
the modulation of his breath and the effort of the imagination in presenting 
the images of those others. These images belong as much to Beckett's reader 
and his or her fantas ies about Beckett's writing as they belong to the unname-
able himself. Thus, we are drawn into an imaginary plane that is not our own; 
we are solicited from the interiority of our own egos by the exteriority of the 
other. We are drawn to this narrator who is barely a narrator. The Unnameable 
undoes subjectivity as the representation of subjectivity that sustains the classi-
cal novel and also the subjectivity of a reader who engages with Beckett in this 
undoing. 
Like most of Beckett's narrators, the unnameable is a figure in ruin, his vi-
sion is weak, his eyes barely work, and this fact makes his comprehension of 
his position difficult to determine and renders his being there all the more 
difficult to bear: "For the visibility, unless it be the state of my eyesight, on ly 
permits me to see what is close beside me ... .In a word, I only see what appears 
immediately in front of me, I only see what appears close beside me, what I 
best see I see ill." 26 Seeing and saying are linked in their disfunction which 
nonetheless continues to function. What is best seen is ill seen. 
Like vision, speech is impaired in Beckett's narrative. The unnameable 
speaks an unregulated language in which phrases happen without reference to 
the modality of their linkages. Why one phrase fo llows on another is rarely 
clear, yet the narrative functions. Here, narrative functions by virtue of the fact 
that it continues to go on. Thus, the function of narrative is divested of any 
essentia l character that narrative would have to fulfill in order to reach its 
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proper perfection. Likewise, the condition of his vis ion intensifies the sense 
that good and ill are self confounding, a fact that becomes the hallmark of 
Beckett's later writing. In this vein, to see well is to ill-see; we have yet to come 
to saying as an ill-saying, though the grounds of its appearance have certainly 
been introduced. The individual phrases of Beckett's narration do not neces-
sari ly contain within them the seeds for what follows. Each phrase is an event 
in itself, a rupture in narration that so licits more narrative. Thus, the meani ng 
of any given text will not be given through the semantic content of the phrases 
that constitute it, but th rough the links between one phrase to the next. The 
obligation to speak drives the links and directs the continu ity which itse lf be-
comes the content of the narrative. Narrative becomes a game of continuity 
and drops its concerns for communication. Or, more provocatively, Beckett's 
narrative language becomes a collection of differends oriented toward an end 
that is elusive and in retreat. 
And Yet l do not despair of one day sparing me, without going silent, and made an 
end, l know it. Yes, the hope is there, once again, of not making me, not losing me, of 
staying here, where I said l have always been, but I had to say somethi ng quick, of 
end ing here, it wou ld be wonderful. But is it to be wished? Yes, it is to be wished, to 
end would be wonderfu l, no matter who I am, no matter where I am. 27 
Under the questions imposed by the ob ligation, "Where now? Who now? 
When now?," 28 the unnameable perdures in an intermediaty position between / 
the beginning and the end; always already begun, he hopes on ly that he might 
be able to end. But, he is trapped in a narrative that goes on. His situation as 
the distant relation of Lucifer emphasizes his peculiar positioning as having an 
interminable beginning. The misery of this position inside of language (the 
ob ligation to speak) offers no possibility of passing to its outside (of ending) 
and forces the narration toward its end which cannot have been dictated by 
some other finality than the non-finality of his narrative situation. If rules 
govern the linkages between sentences, we begin to sense that those rules 
cannot be trusted as rules. This give rise to the drama of the novel as the 
search for an end of speech within speech. 
The miserable position is not yet despairing; the speech hopes its end will 
appear . The unnameable hopes that his end will appear. He waits for an avatar 
to guide him toward that end. The identity of the I and the designation of its 
location can all be relinquished for this one chance wish which were it to 
come true, it "would be wonderfu l:" 
l hope this preamble wi ll soon come to an end and the statement begin that will 
d ispose of me. Unfortunate ly I am afra id , as always, of going on. For to go on means 
going from here, means finding me, losing me, vanishing and beginning again, a 
stranger first, then little by li ttle the same as always, in another place, where I shall say 
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] have always been, of which I shall know nothing, being inca pable of seeing, moving, 
thinking, speaking, but of which little by little, in spite of these handicaps, I shall 
begin to know something, just enough for it to turn out to be the same place as 
always, the same which seems made for me and does not want me, which I seem to 
want and do not want, take yo ur choice, which spews me out or swallows me up, I'll 
never know, which is pe rhaps merely the inside of my distant skull where once I 
wandered, now am fixed , lost for tininess, or straining against tl1e walls, with my 
head, my hands, my feet, my back, and ever murmuring my o ld stories, my old story, 
as if it were the first time. So there is nothing to be afraid of.19 
The obligation to speak is a misery whose end can only be the object of a 
hope, for the likely scenario sha ll be the repetition of misery. The miserable 
space opened by the obligation to speak has a processive quality which 
annihilates va lences of difference in the possibilities for speech. And in 
Beckett's novel, speech stands in the place of experiences, as all experience is 
mediated through the obligation to speak. The horizon of the obligation is an 
uncanny space which is made for the unnameable but does not want him. The 
urge here would be to interpret the phrase as a reference to the construction 
of the physical space that surrounds him, to say that in Beckett's world the 
earth has become an inhospitable place for human beings to dwell. Yet, no 
one needs to read Beckett to learn this. Rather, the unnameable shou ld be 
seen as a locus of speech within language itself that language would rather do 
without, but cannot. The unnameable is made of language, at home in 
language, and not wanted or needed by it. He is thus an expression of the 
alienation of speech within language and is ob ligated to search within this 
hostile environs for a speech which would authorize the end of speech. There 
is nothing to be afraid of in this process precisely because of its processiveness. 
The unnameable cannot come to an end of his speaking; there is no last 
word or final phrase. The authority to end speech retreats from his speech and 
whether he speaks truly or lies is of no significance: 
This vo ice that speaks, knowing that it lies , indifferent to what it says , too old perhaps 
and too abased ever to succeed in saying the words that would be its las t, knowing 
itself useless and its uselessness in vain, not listening to itself but to the si lence that it 
breaks and whence perhaps one day will co me stealing the long clear sigh of advent 
and farewell, is it one?10 
Speech stains the silence it interrupts; this is a well known theme in Beckett's 
works (and not one that we will pursue here) that dates from the "Three 
Dialogues." Speech stains silence, but si lence also infects speech as the 
fantasmatic other that inhabits it and forces it on. Silence functions as the end 
of a ll the speaking, but it is an end that solicits the speech. It forces speech, 
not true speech, soporifics, odes, or speech of any specific determination, but 
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speech . The obligation to speak has been issued by silence. Silence commands 
the speaking to take place and beco mes the unprese ntable of langu age that 
language must present. Thus he goes on: 
So it is I who speak, all alo ne, since l can' t do otherwise. No, I am speechless. Talking 
of speaking, what if l went silent? What would happen to me then? W orse than what 
is happening? But fi e these are questions aga in. That is typica l. l know no more 
questions and they keep on pouring out of my mouth. I think l know what it is, it's to 
prevent the d iscourse from coming to an end, this fu tile discourse which is not 
cred ited to me and brings me not a syllable nearer silence. 11 
Not a syllable nearer to silence, the unnameable's discourse fa ils though he 
will insist that he is do ing his best: "I am doing my best, and fa ili ng again, yet 
again. "32 Failu re co nstitutes one key set of prob lematics in Beckett's writing 
and was transformed by Beckett himself into an alibi to go on- the "Try again, 
fa il aga in, fa il better" of Worstward Ho. As energetic as this effort to fail is (or 
becomes), it is never divorced from pain and pleasure. The couple, p leasure-
pain, inhere in failure as its sentiment. "I don't mind failing, it's a pleasure," 
the unnameable says. Yet, he fo llows that proclamation with, "but I want to go 
silent." 33 Indeed, that silence would open (he thinks) a horizon of possibilities 
for a life "worth having:" "Then it would be a life worth having, a li fe at last. 
My speech parched vo ice at rest would fill with spittle, I'd let it flow over and 
over, happy at last, dribbling with li fe , my pensum ended, in the silence."34 
T he obligatio n to speak imposes itself on the unnameable and is, of itself, 
not justified by reference to any other prescription or command. "Possessed of 
n othing but my vo ice, the vo ice, it may seem natura l, once the idea of obliga-
tion has been swallowed, that I should interpret it as an obligation to say 
so mething. "35 As if ex nihilo it appears and has to be swallowed; the unname-
able thus becomes coextensive to his obligation to speak which appears as an 
obligation to say so mething. Saying something and speaking are not reducible 
to the sa me thing, that is, the obligation directs only the action to be under-
taken (speak) and does not dictate the content of that speech. There is thus a 
difference between the event of speech and its content. To place too much 
importance on the content of the unnameable's words yields a picture of 
Beckett 's writing as inco mprehensible madness, such is the view of Lukacs.36 
To understand the narration as an event itself, an event of witness born of the 
obligation to speak permits us to approach the text in the truth of its self-
presentation. The text is not about anything that ca n be named (a banal po int, 
considering the title), but about the naming of that event which is, in itself, 
unnameable because it is both within and without the language that both 
wants and refuses its presence and presentation . The sublime of the worst, in 
The Unnameable, is that feeling of immobility which erupts in the miserable 
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space that the narration constructs between the cogn itive demand for sense 
and the imagination's capacity to form an image. The obligation to speak bars 
the passage from one side to the other. 
Faced then with the material impossibili ty of going any further I should no doubt 
have had to stop, unless of course I elected to set off aga in at o nce in the opposite 
direction, to unscrew myself as it were, after havi ng screwed myself to a standstill , 
which would have been an experience rich in interest and ferti le in surprises ifl am to 
believe what I once was told, in spite of my protests, namely that there is not road so 
dull, on the way out, but it has quite a different aspect, quite a different du llness, on 
the way back, and vice versa. No good wriggling, I'm a mine of useless knowledge. 37 
Mastery 
Rarely is a character in Beckett's narrations without some kind of master, a 
controlling figure that the discourse of the novel acknowledges all the while 
the actions the characters undertake in the diegesis struggle against him. This 
figure is a minimal condition of communication. In On Stories, Richard 
Kearney insists that all narratives, even Beckett's narratives have a 
communicative function that takes the form of someone, x, telling some other, 
y, something about z. 38 In The Unnameable Mahood performs this function that 
estab lishes a minimal form of communication. 
Mahood does not start out as Mahood, but becomes him through an act 
of naming bereft of all ceremony and ritual. The unnameable gives the name 
as a whim, as a phrase that follows upon the phrases he is obligated to utter. 
Mahood begins as Basil who enters the narration in conjunction with the no-
tion of time: "I say years, though here there are no years. What matter how 
long? Years is one of Basil's ideas. A short time, a long time, it 's a ll the same." 39 
Basil introduces the unnameable to the idea of time, though that idea does 
not function as time would have functioned for a modern sensibi li ty. Moder-
nity makes time one of the key constituent elements of experience. Through 
the work of time, events become experiences through an act of consciousness 
that unifies the disparate sense data into a cognizable whole. Time determines 
experience in the modern world of En lightenment thought, whi le in the un-
nameable's world time is but an idea that Basil has. Who is Basil? It does not 
matter; what matters about Basil is that he can become important: "Decidedly, 
Basil is becoming important, I'll call him Mahood instead, I prefer that, I'm 
queer. It was he who told me stor ies about me, lived in my stead, issued forth 
from me, came back to me, entered back into me, heaped stor ies on my 
head." 40 Mahood becomes a mediating figure in the unnameable's self-
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narration; he gives the unnameable the horde of stories he has to tell. He is an 
occupying presence who tricks the unnameable into believing the determina-
tions of the stories he tells. "That's one of Mahood's favourite tricks, to pro-
duce ostensibly independent testimony in support of my historical existence. "41 
The Unnameable is a struggle with this historical existence that moves to-
ward a configuration of being as a minimal presence. The unnameable strug-
gles with language. This struggle configures being with the language a 
dispossessed of consciousness that is nonetheless conscious of the disposes-
sion. In this, the unnameable moves us toward the worst. 
The Sublime, The Worst 
While The Unnameable is the first definitive move toward a minimal subject 
and hence minimal novel, it is yet to participate in the aesthetic of the worst. 
For Beckett, the worst is the effect of a processive worsening, the effect of an 
effort at trying to worsen: "Not yet to try worsen," and "To try worsen." 42 To 
try worsen entails the work of narrativ ity searching for its "least," "unnullable 
least" without which it becomes "naught." The aim of the worst is not to / 
unword the world, but to approach presence in its ever retreating vivacity and 
decay. It is thus an aesthetic program that figures language as the figuration of 
presence. As such, presence is indeterminate and resistant to determination: as "'-
soon as it has been determined it transforms itself such that the determination 
reveals itself as inadequate to the event. Determinations become phantoms of 
presence; they are the shades that populate the late Beckett narration. 
Narrative determines the shades and undoes them. The work of 
doing/undoing permits Beckett to approach the real as approachable and not 
just fundamentally horrifying as the vacant landscapes and ruined figures of 
his narratives, the likes of Molloy, Moran, Malone, the Unnameable, or the 
woman of "Rockaby," might encourage us to venture. To argue that the worst 
offers a representation of our world as it has been fled by the gods and 
meaning is to render unto Beckett a simplicity that his writing does not 
possess (though, perhaps, he would have liked it to have had it). The 
doing/undoing that characterizes the mechanism of the worst as narrative 
work is part of a strategy that Beckett engages in order to be ab le to witness 
new demonstrations of being. 
What, then, is the truth of the worst? Does the worst aim at the truth? 
Certainly it aims for something? It must seek something otherwise the project 
as project drifts into meaninglessness. Truth in narrative typically appears as 
/ 
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the narrative's adequacy to a set of events that are, in princip le, witnessable. 
Witnessing is an effort (is at least conceived, juridically) to determine the truth 
of an event. To bear witness requires the witness to speak truly of the event or 
events that came to pass before him or her. Thus, if Beckett's writing shou ld 
be considered an attempt to bear witness to the real, then it shou ld be possib le 
to determine the truthfulness of his witness ing. The question is how to deter-
mine Beckett's truthfulness. The question places Beckett in the genera l con-
text of Realism, certa inly of that Rea lism that Georg Lukacs found himself at 
pains to defend in many of his essays. In "The Ideology of Modernism," 
Lukacs engages in a polemic aga inst "Modernist" writing as ahistorica l, ideo-
logical, insanity. Lukacs claims that Beckett forsakes any kind of objectivity in 
the "simple description of reality." 43 "Lack of objectivity," writes Lukacs, "in 
the description of the outer world finds its comp lement in the reduction of 
the reality to a nightmare. Beckett's Molloy is perhaps the ne plus ultra of this 
development." 44 Lukacs's estimation of Beckett's novel depends not the least 
on Beckett's novel, but on a prior commitment to a set of va lues that literature 
must have and which includes an emphatic belief in the capacity of language 
to determine reality adequately. Lukacs believes that a "sim ple description of 
reality" is possible, but more importantly, that from such axiomatic claims, the 
truth of the reality in all of its complexity can be represented and ascerta ined . 
That is, description is thought of as both possib le and adequate. 
If Beckett could just remain a Realist, he would have fewer problems in 
his testimony. "The literature of realism, aiming at a truthful reflection of real-
ity, must demonstrate both the concrete and abstract potentialities of human 
beings in extreme situations of this kind [that is, of the tragic kind]. A charac-
ter's concrete potentiality once revealed, his abstract potentialities will appear 
essentially inauthentic," 45 so Lukacs asserts. If Beckett cou ld be a realist the 
"real" possibilities for the likes of Molloy would appea r to him and to us in 
plain relief, for indeed the being of reality is such that "concrete" determina-
tions make the abstracted ones fade into the mean inglessness that su pports 
their allure. But to consider Molloy as obsessed with abstractions is ludicrous; 
Molloy obsesses over the most co ncrete things, they just happen to be those 
things that the synthetic views of Lukacs's variety of realism finds meaningless, 
for indeed, they are the kinds of observations and determinations that do not 
well serve the finality of reali sm. The truth of Beckett's texts, then, fa lls out-
side the range of those texts that are valued and extolled by the purveyors of 
rea li sm. Realism believes in the possibility of its project and does not question 
its fundamental co mmitment- that reality is representable. As soo n as this 
question appears, as soon as it is posed in writing, the project of realism and 
the criteria it elaborates to judge works, recede into the background. Truth in 
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narration as the adequate representation of an event holds no sway in the 
judgment of Beckett's narrations. To insist on those criteria as the source of 
judgment will inflict on Beckett's work a charge to which it is unable to re-
spond save by a refutation of the criteria that make the charge itself possible. 
Between the charges of realism and the stammerings of Beckett's work lies a 
differend. It is this differend that the worst as a figuration of the sublime sen-
timent aims to address. The worst is a search for the minimal language that 
resides just this side of annihilation. The approach to this limit produces the 
sublime sentiment. The work of the worst is not a refutation of realism, but an 
operation that has forsaken the rules of narrativity that make realism what it 
is. The worst is the effort to witness the retreat of the event from language in 
language. 
Worstward Ho and the Sublime 
Worstward Ho is a narrative that aims to go on, to move on, to continue on 
when it is no longer poss ible for its narrator, Beckett, to continue to narrate. 
Writing appears fina lly to fail: "On. Say on. Be sa id on. Somehow on. Till 
nohow on. Said nohow on."46 Beckett tries to go on until going on is no 
longer possible. He tries to go on until it is no longer possible to be going on, 
even for it to be said that he will have gone on. He tries to go on until he 
reaches that moment when there will be no way to go on. His name for this 
cond ition is "nohow on." The narration aims to accomplish what until this 
point of writing it had not been ab le to accomplish. It aims to reach a point 
from which it is impossible to continue to go on, a definitive and permanent 
end. In the opening passage, Worstward Ho lays bare the limits of its narrative 
scope. First, there is an external limit to the text; it seeks to become what it is 
not, to transform itself into the stillness that the text's stammerings fill. 
Second, the text proceeds from an internal limit that is the capacity to 
imagine, to invent presence where there is but absence, holes, si lences. Thus 
the text aims for the nohow on and proceeds from it. The two limits, the 
internal and the externa l, propel the narrative toward its end which 
continually withdraws. The withdrawal of the end shows every step to be a 
misstep: "Say for be said. Missaid. From now say for be missaid." 47 Every 
narrative saying missays. 
The saying-missaying relation is a relation of tense or time. "Say" becomes 
"be said" is a shift either from the present indicative active or present impera-
tive to the present subjunctive, which in English indicates an uncertainty in 
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states of affairs or an indeterminability of them, and thereby opens the hori-
zon of the yet to be, or the future. The text attends to the determination of its 
own unfolding even as it calls those determinations into question. It questions 
the textual events that constitute it, and it does so in the very instants in which 
it becomes what it is. Worstward Ho takes this interminable indetermination as 
its starting point and uses it to estab lish a new point, a zero time in which it 
will be possible to affix all of the narrative stammerings to their proper mo-
ment. But, the indeterminability of time menaces the narrative, troubles its 
coherence as a narrative, and intterupts its narrativity. Time fai ls narrative. 
As time fails narrative, so will space and place. "Say a body. Where none. 
No mind. Where none. That at least. A place. Where none. For the body. To 
be in. Move in. Out of. Back into. No. No out. No back. Only in. Stay in. On 
in. Still." 49 The subjective limi ts of space and time do not hold the text to-
gether. From its paradoxical dual limitation, the text seeks a different route to 
failure: "All of old . Nothing else ever. Ever tried. Ever failed. No matter. Try 
again. Fail aga in. Fail better." 49 Beckett's conclusion to the first section of 
Worstward Ho is both a statement of purpose and a commentary on the writing 
he produced until that moment. On the first account, all of Worstward Ho 
dismisses time and space as the constitutive components of narrativity and yet 
they reappear. Even though they fail, are doomed to fail in Beckett's vision, 
they wi ll be unleashed aga in in a narrative that will try to do better with them 
than they had done before. Even though narrative does not end, he tries to 
bring it to an end. 
This passage is also a commentary on his writing. The first paragraphs 
which had been stripped bare of language, especially those signs which would 
function as grammatical subjects, seem to carry through what The Unnameable, 
for example, could not: to get rid of the authoria l I. Yet, even this move does 
not gain Beckett enough, and must be reconsidered, tried again, such that he 
might fail better and to solid ify the aims and ends of narrative. Narrative in 
Beckett's vision is a means of reconceiving the idea of the human that had 
been lost at Saint Lo and which Beckett sought to reconceive. 
The first part, then, of Worstward Ho's twelve parts, each separated by 
three asterisks at the head of the section, sets the program that the rest of the 
experiment will follow. Like any experiment, it has its limits and its goa ls: the 
paradoxical limit of seeking the nohow on from within it and trying again to 
fail better. The text is a repetition, but not a replaying. It is a rewriting that is 
not just a rescription, but a rewriting that writes anew what came before. It is 
an experiment that hopes to present the unpresentable of narration: the worst. 
The anamnes is of the worst, its rewriting, is the concrete figuration of the sub-
li me in Beckett. 
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Subtractive Method 
Worstward Ho proceeds from image to image by a subtractive method. The 
image that Beckett begins with is, almost in the next breath, negated. The 
process of lessening the text pushes Beckett to find the minimum required for 
the narrative to happen at all. He begins with the body and the place. 
First the body. No. First the place. No. First both. Now either. Sick of the either try 
the other. Sick of it back sick of the either. So on. Somehow on . Till sick of both. 
Throw up and go. Where neither. Ti ll sick of there. Throw up and back. The body 
again. Where none. Try again. Fa il again. Better again. Or better worse. Fai l worse 
again. Still worse again . Ti ll sick for good . Throw up for good. Go for good. Where 
neither for good . Good and all ·50 
The difficu lty in beginning the text lies in finding with what to begin: body or 
place. Then Beckett plays a game with the terms: either/other. It seems that 
either the either or the other gets him the same thing: fa ilure. The text is going 
to fa il, Beckett believes, but rather than succumbing to rage o r despair the 
narrative transforms fai lure from being the mark of a defeat to being the aim 
of narration. Since the text is going to fa il, make it then fail like no other dare 
to fa il , or so the Beckettian stance appears here. In this paragraph, better and 
worse become replaceable terms in a single minded teleological narrative that 
drives itself toward what it has never seen, heard, or been. From what has 
been done, Beckett attempts to see what will have been the possibility of his 
narrative. 
Since neither body nor place provide any ground, any static or stable point 
of departure the narration continues on its search. Emphatically, it continues 
on and on. But its continuity is reticent, with each step it takes, with each 
word it ventures, it can also slide back, erase, and negate what it has just ve n-
tured to present. And it must continue to proceed in this way until it discovers 
that ground that can support its continuity, however provisionally. "It stands. 
What? Yes. Say it stands. Had to up in the end and stand. Say bones. No 
bones but say bones. Say ground. No ground but say ground. So as to say 
pain." 51 The sentences of Worstward Ho stam mer. They do not concern them-
selves with their referentiality; if the content of the sentence, its meaning or 
sense, does not correspond to actual states of affa irs, an emphatic saying sup-
plements it so that the sentence does not become sheer nonsense. The status 
of reality is not fixed or given, but estab lished in narrative acts. Lyotard makes 
a similar gesture in The Differend. In §3, he claims: 
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Reality is not what is 'given' to this or that 'subject,' it is a state of the referent (that 
about which one speaks) which results from the effectuation of estab lishment 
procedures defined by a unanimously agreed upo n protocol, and from the possibility 
offered to anyo ne to recommence this e ffectuation as often as he or she wa nts. 52 
Reality is here conceived as the effect of a phrase, which is an instance of 
Language. Where Lyotard differs fro m Beckett is in his no tion th at the 
procedures which make the establishment of a reality poss ible are public and 
repeatable. Beckett's phrases effect the establishment of a rea lity, but this 
reality is not yet established according to a protocol which has unanimous 
consent. This "yet" is crucial and marks the postmodern aspect of Beckett's 
project. Remember that one of the tra its of the postmodern is a relatio n to 
time indicated by the future perfect. Postmodern works do not operate only 
(or primarily) with the "given" rules of narrative, but experiment with those 
rules in order to forge new ones which will become recognized as modern. The 
postmodern forges the rules of the modern and so the "reality" which its 
phrases effect do not yet belong to the genre of cognitive phrases or cognitive 
judgments. The reality that Beckett's text refers to is a reality in the offing, 
which has yet to be recogni zed as reality. 
In this passage from Beckett's text, he is able to discover an underlying 
ground, a substratum of experience that will permit him to co ntinue: Pain. 
The saying of pain (which is also an illsaying) fixes it as the modulating ground 
of narration. The factuality of this pain keeps the text moving, keeps the pro-
ject of narrative itself on the move toward its relief or change: 
No mind and pain? Say yes that the bo nes may pain till no cho ice but stand . 
Somehow up and stand. O r better worse remains. Say remains of mind where no ne to 
permit of pain. Pain of bones till no cho ice but up and stand . So mehow up. 
So mehow stand. Remains of mind where none fo r the sake of pain. Here of bones. 
O ther exa mples if needs must. O f pain. Relief from. C hange of. 53 
The progress ive worsening of the prospects for narrative corresponds to a 
progressive intensification of its presentations. That is to say, the co ntraction 
of narrative poss ibilities does not eliminate the project of the novel or deaden 
it, but rather invigorates it. The worsening of narrative is an infusion of life 
into literature; it is an insistence on survival and on discovering modes in 
which to articulate and testify to survival. The task of modulating pain, of 
transforming it, of inventing a human being such that narrating pain is even 
possible in the dark and dying culture in which Beckett lived and in which we 
survive menaces literature. It troubles its existence at all leve ls, po litica l, social, 
moral, and aesthetic. Worstward Ho is then an ironic and jubilant struggle to 
the end of the possibilities of literature in general, and of Beckett's writing in 
particular. Pain is not just the risk of this struggle, but the ground. In Beckett's 
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perspective, pain becomes the arche and logos of all reality, the underlyi ng 
substratum of human experience with which narrative must find a way to 
narrate. The feeling demands to be put into phrases, as Lyotard says in The 
Differend §23: 
In the differend, someth ing "asks" to be put into phrases, and suffers from the wrong 
of not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the human beings 
who thought they could use language as an instrument of communication learn 
through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence (and of pleasure which 
accompanies the invention of a new idiom), that they are summoned by language, not 
to augment to their profit the quantity of information communicable through 
existing idioms, but to recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they 
can presently phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not 
yet exist. 54 
The feeling demands to be put into phrases, yet the idioms in which to phrase 
the feeling does not yet exist. Beckett's work, especia lly Worstward Ho, is an 
experiment in the invention of an idiom. It does not, therefore, relish in 
senselessness, but seeks a way to present the feeling that energizes it in a 
manner that does justice to the feel ing. This is the way in which the pain of 
failure may become pleasurable- through the invention of a new idiom. 
Worstward Ho is predicated upon an emphatic claim about the nature of 
failure and on the drive to go on in and toward failure, to continue to write 
with failure, and in spite of it. "All of old. Nothing else ever. But never so 
failed. Worse failed. With care never worse failed." 55 In the prospects of failing 
differently, Beckett finds the means whereby writing will continue. Failure 
here becomes the chief concern of the writing; but not any kind of fai lure will 
do. 
This passage, like most of Beckett's writing, is highly referential to Beck-
ett's other works. Hence, the first sentences entail a claim of accomplishment 
that has become stale and a pred iction of the future. The "all of old" further 
situates Worstward Ho in a different relation to time than all of those works 
that gained their existence before it, not just all of Beckett's works, but all 
works. Beckett refuses to acquiesce in tradition, to be bound by it, even if that 
means future possibilities will have been eclipsed. Nevertheless, by the end of 
the section what appears as a hopeless position of misery becomes a way into a 
future of possibility: "No future in this. Alas yes." 56 The future that Beckett 
affirms is the future of narrative. Worstward Ho begins in an experience of con-
traction in which the possibilities for writing are but few; it employs a subtrac-
tive method that allows writing to continue. So it starts with a body in pain 
and that body slowly stands for it has, "No choice but stand." The body stands 
out of necessity; it is not the act of a free agent in possession of his faculties , 
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but a ruined body fulfilling obligations. With the one body "up at last," 57 
Beckett continues his project: "With care never worse fai led." The worst has 
never fai led for it has yet to be tried, has yet to be mined for its possib ili ties. 
Pursuing the worst, then, becomes the genuinely new. 
Beckett's understanding of the worst does not imply an ethical claim, but 
an epistemological and ontological claim: "Dim light source unknown. Know 
minimum. Know nothing no. Too much to hope. At most mere minimum. 
Mere-most minimum." 58 Here the class ical symbol of knowledge and being, 
light, appears as a diffused and unspecified presence. This perception of light 
has to be understood in contradistinction to Plato's understanding of the Sun 
and of light in The Republic (especially Book VI) and to the medieval under-
standi ng of lumen naturalae. Arcane differences aside, both the Greeks and the 
medievals used images of light, the sun, illumination, as proxies for knowledge 
and Being. These conste llations of images inaugurate an entire heritage of 
prejudice in which what is deemed most va luab le, treasured, and loved, are 
those things that participate in, or are illumined by light. In this heritage, to 
be is to be visible and to be good mean to be most luminescent. 
Beckett tries to break from this heritage, to find a way out of the pu ll it 
has on the cu lture of writing, which, as we have said, is also a po litical cu lture. 
To find the worst, Beckett will have to find a point in being which is not noth-
ing, but which is the most minimum quantum or intensity of presence that 
writing can encoun ter. This is one of the explanations for the spare and bare 
prose that we find in Worstward Ho. Beckett engages a minimal writing to ap-
proach the minimal conception of being that presses him on. 
With one minimal being up and stand ing, groan ing from the pain, the 
text then shows another: "Another. Say another. Head sunk on cr ippled 
hands. Vertex vertica l. Eyes clenched. Seat of all. Germ of all. "59 The saying of 
the other is an illsaying of the other. But, as we have said above, it will do for 
Beckett. This figure becomes the source of hope in this portion of the text. It 
is a figure of imagination that Beckett has presented before in Imagination 
Dead Imagine. Imagination, which is a fie ld of contradictions and impossibili-
ties, a field where any saying is as good or as ill as any other saying, is the 
source of the work that will take Beckett to the worst. It is also the site, or the 
faculty of mind, whence sublime affect will or iginate when imagination fa ils to 
present a cognizable image of the real. Wittingly or not, the sublime is in 
league with the worst. The worst is an uncognizeable presence that menaces 
imagination and understand ing which in tum vacillate in the impossib le dif-
ference which distinguishes them. The worst is thus of the sublime and the 
remainder of narrative after its lessening has been fully pursued and "accom-
plished." 
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The figure with clenched eyes stands in a place that is "small" and "vast": 
"How if not boundless bounded."60 The contradictory space illustrates the na-
ture of sublime presentation which resists any determination in space or time 
according to the rules of cognition. The place where Beckett's "couple" is is 
not a place that is determinable according to such rules, but is just there. 
Whereever that is. "Beyondless. Thenceless there. Thitherless there. Thence-
less thitherless there." 61 Neither origin nor destination, without interior or 
exterior limit, the space is just there. It is a place which is nowhere, not deter-
minable on a map and yet a place that Beckett occupies in writing and which 
his reader witnesses through the text. The classic conceptions of the sublime 
permeate the text and render the worst an unmistakable figuration of it. 
Throughout the novel, oral and aural metaphors shift to metaphors of vi-
sion: "see for be seen. Misseen. From now see for be misseen."62 The text re-
peats what we have already read in an earlier section of the text. What had 
been sa id and missaid is the imaginative space the writing of the worst tries to 
open. Two figures, then, were sa id in a space which is there and nowhere and 
hence: "Where then but there see now-."63 See now what? "First back turned 
the shade astand. In the dim void see first back turned shade astand. Still."64 
As the narrative approaches closer to its images, to those elements which focal-
ize its attention and our own, the prose turns toward a poetic rhetoric. The 
sentences do not convey meanings, but are saturated with it in the sense that 
poetic objects themselves are so saturated. This is a key difference between 
poetry and prose, especia lly between poetry and the novel. In the novel, style is 
frequently understood to function in the service of the texts message or aim, 
whereas in poetry style is the aim. The novel communicates an event by its 
style while the poem is the style of an event. In poetry, form and content are 
unified while in the novel they are antagonistic. Beckett's novel, however, 
plays these divisions nearly to death. One might suggest that the worst that can 
happen to prose is to transform it into poetry, to nullify the differences be-
tween the poem and prose, between lyric and novel. 
Beckett's prose unleashes a very simple poetic device; the repetition or re-
frain: "Where then but there see now another. Bit by bit an old man and 
child. In the dim void bib by bit an old man and child. Any other would do as 
ill."65 In this vein, the effect of the repetition is to continue the poeticizing of 
the novel, to draw the reader to the minimal qualities of narrative. The sen-
tences in this project gain their sense and effect through the saturation of im-
age in the sound of the signs. 
The aim of the writing is to seek the worst, and its objects are objects of 
imagination or memory. Bit by bit these figures appear, an old man and child. 
Now we have seen the introduction of two couples: first, the shade whose 
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ground is pain, then the clenched eyes in the place where there is no place. 
These minimal beings become the objects of memory, the old man and child 
who plod on. The old man and child are the effects of an addition, from the 
minimal, barely human beings, beings which are human solely by their ability 
to feel pain, we arrive at beings which are determined according to their ages. 
Hand in hand with equal plod they go. In the free hands-no. Free empty hands. 
Backs turned both bowed with eq ual plod they go. The child hand raised to reach the 
holding hand. Ho ld the o ld holding hand. Hold and be held . Plod on and never 
recede. Slowly with never a pause plod o n and never recede. Backs turned. Both 
bowed. Joined by held holding hands. Plod on as one. One shade. Another shade.66 
This tender, almost sentimental, passage illustrates the fusion of novel and 
lyric gestures in Beckett's writing toward the worst. Hand in hand, the two 
shades fuse into one that remain two, but also one shade that is an addition to 
those that have already been presented. In that sense, it is an addition to the 
text that is at the same time a subtraction, a saying that missays, and a seeing 
that sees ill. The writing nearly gets carried away with the jubilance of 
add itio n, of the drive for more rather than less. Yet, Beckett catches himself 
and closes the possibility abruptly with the m-dash and negation. The more 
things that attach to the shades, the more human they wi ll beco me and the 
task of this writing is to conceptualize the human in its minimal form- the 
"unnullable least," and not as a being which borrows its existence from the 
sign of the Infinite. 
These first sections of the novel present the initial stakes, aim, and object 
of the writing. They play with the working of imagination on its objects in the 
context of novelistic and lyric forms and figuration. In the fifth section, the 
imagination works on the shades. It places them, as if on a stage, into different 
postures, gives them cues to entrances and exits. "Head sunk on cr ippled 
hands. C lenched staring eyes. At in the dim void shades. One astand at rest. 
One o ld man and child. At rest plodding on. Any others would do as ill. Al-
most any. Almost as ill. "67 
Beckett presents a pair of shades: the old man and child, and the 
crouched, clench-eyed figure. Through a series of reduplications and reversals, 
the text seeks a means of change, a mechanism that will transfigure the image. 
Yet, it stumbles, at each instant, over the inevitable identity of the image- any 
image does as good or as ill as any other and hence the images may as well be 
the same. The text is dogged by a difference that is never different enough, a 
difference that produces cleaved identities. The modulation of the images 
leaves them, "Each time somehow changed."68 
Even as the text is its own metatext in search of its own conditions for be-
ing, seeking its own mean s of self-just ification, it forces its images on. On and 
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on. The text, as the images it engages, continues. But, there is no reason that 
the text should go on; narrative has no principle that renders its existenc nec-
essary. It is a provisional act with a provisional existence. 
Next sudden go ne the twain. Next sudden back. Unchanged. Say now unchanged. So 
far unchanged. Backs turned. Heads sunk. Dim hair. Dim white and hair so fair that 
in that dim light dim white. Black greatcoats to heels. Dim black. Bootheels. Now the 
two right. Now the two left. As on with equal plod they go. No ground. Plod as on 
void. Dim hands. Dim white. Two free and two as one. So sudden gone sudden back 
unchanged as one dark shade plod unreceding on. 69 
The two shades are images of memory and of literature, of memories of 
literature, in that they belong to time past and to writings past. It is hard not 
to see Vladimir and Estragon 70 in this image, with the black greatcoats and the 
unending motion, as of their waiting. The passage indicates, then a recollec-
tion of youth and all of the writing of old. This memory is also the condition 
of Beckett's character, Krapp, who confronts his youth from his o ld age. 
In Krapp's Last Tape, Beckett presents us with a ruined figure who rumi-
nates on his ruination. He makes the ruins speak, and they speak of the days 
prior to being ruined, even if it is only through a tape player. For Krapp, the 
mechanical reproducibility of youth protects him from the detritus he has be-
come. In seeking the worst as a means of making something new, Worstward 
Ho falls at moments into repetitions of the past. But, with each repetition 
Beckett shows his memory as anamnesiac, for the fixation on the prior event is 
put to the service of the experiment that Worstward Ho itself is. 
As it plods on, Worstward Ho puts us on the brink of the anamnesiac crea-
tion: 
The dim. Far and wide the same. High and low. Unchanging. Say now unchanging. 
Whence no knowing. No saying. Say only such dim light as never. On all. Say a grot 
in that void. A gulf. Then in that grot or gulf such dimmest light as neve r. Whence no 
knowing. No saying.71 
Here the beginning of the rewriting (in the Lyotardian sense of rewriting) that 
exceeds the grip of repetition and that opens on to something new, though we 
can say, with Beckett, very little about that something. 
The situation of this passage places us in familiar territory, Biblical terri-
tory. The world as we know it requires a creative act, a primary and originary 
act without which there would be nothing to know. The creation of the world 
begins, in the Hebrew Bible with the introduction of light, the fiat lux, which 
figures prominently in the history of the sublime. The introduction of light 
beco mes, according to that history the decisive model of sublime figuration. 
The introduction of light in the void, in the separation between the void, the 
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heavens, the water , the land, mobi lizes the bib li ca l story and feelings of awe 
and reverence we have for sublime figuratio ns. Beckett's text participates in 
this history, but instead of trying to repeat it, instead of trying to bo rrow its 
power, it ho lds itse lf in abeyance. That is, the repetition of the old sto ry, 
which places us in the zone of subl ime figurations and hence of the sublime 
sentiment, is an occasion for Beckett to try to fa il to narrate and hence avoid 
the traps of repetition and remembrance. The tradit ion of the sub lime in writ-
ing becomes the inescapable noise that Beckett hopes to wo rsen. 
But to worsen the sub li me, will it rea lly be enough? A sublime not of the 
noble, but of the worst? What happens to the sublime if Beckett worsens it? 
What ca n it mean to worsen the sub lime? The terms the text mobili zes to ar-
ticulate this worsening are not just the co mparative adjectives- worse, worst, 
but a who le series of negative suffixes and prefixes: "un," "less." These terms 
continue the operation of Beckett 's subtract ive method of presenting the 
worst: 
Worse less. By no stretch more. Worse fo r wa nt of better less. Less best. No. Naught 
bes t. Best worse. No. Not best worse. Naught not best worse. Less best worse. No. 
Least. Least bes t worse. Least never to be naught. Never to naught be brought. Never 
by naught be nu lled. Unnullable leas t. Say that best worse. With leaste ning words say 
leas t best worse. For want of worser wo rst. U nlessenable least best worse.n 
This statement is Beckett's most direct description of the worst and the 
struggles he engages in to find it. The best way to say the worst is to name it 
the "unlessenable least." The un lesse nable least is the minimum prese nce 
available to language and thought that resides at the limit of nullification . The 
worst is not nu llification or annihilation, but that limit where nullifi cation 
and annihi lation vaci llate as possible determinations. The unnullable least is 
the worst. This is the d irection that Beckett takes narrative, and the zone in 
which he reconfigures the sublime. The difficulty of th.i s descr iption is th.at it 
mobili zes a conceptual language to talk about what is unconceptualizable. The 
worst is not a concept in the classical sense; it is not a unity of discrete limits 
under which can be subsumed any number of sensible prese ntations. 
Determinate judgments, therefore, ca nnot provide any understanding of the 
text. The text cannot be constituted as an obj ect of cognition; it is a text of 
ideas, in the Kantian sense. Ideas are obj ects of tho ught (not cognitio n) that 
cannot be subsumed under a concept because there is no directly perceiveable 
sense data to provide the materi al for judgments. With the worst, we are in the 
context of presentation through negation, negative presentations, and not the 
positive co nstitution of objects of sense. The worst places us in the context of 
the reflective judgment. 
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Beckett approaches the limits of narrative, he seeks a narration that is not 
"a ll of o ld," a narrative that has yet to be seen, a narrative that reso lves the 
fa ilure of narrative to fa il well enough . Worstward Ho is symptomatic in this 
regard, fo r rather than resolving the narrative, Beckett abandons it, sudden ly, 
and cannot see the n ext move. 
Enough. Sudden enough. Sudden all fa r. No move and sudden all far. All least. Three 
pins. O ne pinhole. In dimmost dim. Vasts apart. At bo unds of boundless void. 
Whence no fa rther. Best worse no fa rther. Nohow less. Nohow worse. Nohow 
naught. Nohow on. 
Sa id nohow o n. 13 
The abando nment of the text is not surprising. Beckett frequently abandoned 
texts. As his experimentations did not fail well enough, he abandoned them, 
so metimes taking them up aga in, as in "From an Abandoned W ork." In the 
beginning of his abandonment Beckett seems to have found the point from 
which it will be impossible to continue to go on, the place of the "nohow on ." 
It is like a game, three pins and one hole- how can you win? Since he cannot 
win, he has found the "unnullable least," from which there is "nohow worse." 
But, Beckett is never one to allow himself to indulge for long in the success of 
his nar rative to arrive at the point of its longing. For "nohow on" comes 
round aga in to narrative: "Said nohow on." The narrative of the worst which 
aims to arrive at the po int fro m which narrative cannot proceed leads to a 
point from which narrative originates itself again. 
The sublime of the worst is the movement of narrative from its own col-
lapsing into narrative; it is the suspension of narrative in narrative. A collapse 
and a suspension that finally succeeds at fa iling to fail. Beckett's sublime bears 
witness to this conjunctio n of contradictory fo rces. And it does so as an at-
tempt to rethink the condition and the idea of the human that was be-
queathed to him and to us at St. LO . The sublime of the worst is a witnessing 
of the conditions of human li fe at St. Lo, to be sure, but more importantly it is 
a statement on the manner in which the condition of the human is to be 
thought again . The worst is the sublime of the inhuman human in ruins 
which, according to Beckett, we have beco me. Worstward Ho completes the 
experiment that was begun in the first "Tri logy," and which was crystallized in 
the unnameable's primary (un)question: "Where now? Who now? When 
now?" 
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